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Abstract
We study the role of communication in collusive market sharing. In a series of
Cournot oligopoly experiments with multiple markets and repeated interaction, we
vary the types of information that firms can exchange. We distinguish between hard
information—verifiable information about past conduct—and soft information—
unbinding information about future conduct. We find that the effect of communi-
cation on the firms’ ability to collude depends on the type of information available:
market prices increase only slightly when hard information allows perfect moni-
toring of rivals’ past actions, but the price raise due to soft information, however,
is substantial. The explicit consent of each cartel member to a common collusive
strategy, even if stated only once, drives this strong effect. Our results point to
the types and contents of communication that should be of particular concern to
antitrust authorities.
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1 Introduction
What role does communication play in collusive market sharing? We study this ques-
tion in a laboratory experiment. Our findings suggest that the effect of communication
on market sharing depends on the type of communication involved: while non-binding
one-time communication on future planned conduct can establish market sharing almost
perfectly, the exchange of disaggregated information on recent past behavior—which al-
lows the identification and selective punishment of deviators—increases market prices
only slightly. Antitrust rules condition enforcement on information that is observable
and verifiable in court. Therefore, evidence on whether firms communicated serves as
a smoking gun in antitrust procedures against collusion. To understand which type of
communication carries the highest collusive potential is thus central for the design of
effective antitrust rules.
Market sharing is a collusive practice prohibited by the European Community com-
petition rules.1 A market sharing agreement typically determines exclusive territories
along geographical borders, the so-called home markets. The colluding firms refrain from
entering each other’s home market with the result that each market remains insulated
from the others. Market sharing agreements jeopardize the unity of a common market
and, thus, the European Commission (EC) takes a particularly tough stance on these
arrangements.2
Evidence on interfirm communication and explicit agreements is crucial for the an-
titrust enforcement against collusive practices because it makes anticompetitive contacts
between firms visible and verifiable in court and thereby facilitates legal prosecution.
Despite this fact, colluding firms commonly engage in incriminating communication, and
they do so even in the face of large monetary fines (see, e.g., Genesove and Mullin, 2001;
Harrington, 2006; Levenstein and Suslow, 2008; Hyytinen et al., 2019). Hence, communi-
cation must be a valuable tool for establishing collusive agreements. Although interfirm
communication has recently attracted substantial attention from economic researchers,
we still know little about what type of communication facilitates collusion.3
1We follow the terminology of Belleflamme and Bloch (2004, 2008): by ‘market sharing’, we designate
the reciprocal collusive agreement in which each firm is assigned monopoly rights over a market to
distinguish it from ‘production quotas’ where the firms jointly restrict output within a market. Other
names for these arrangements are to be found in the literature, e.g., spheres of influence and multimarket
contact (Bernheim and Whinston, 1990), collusion at the extensive and intensive margin (Byford and
Gans, 2014), collusion with and without trade (Lommerud and Sørgard, 2001; Colonescu and Schmitt,
2003; Bond and Syropoulos, 2008), exclusive territories and sales quotas (Harrington, 2006).
2In a landmark case, the two major producers of soda ash, Solvay and ICI, were sanctioned with the
largest antitrust fine ever imposed by the EC at that time (1990) for having operated a market sharing
agreement. The EC found the firms guilty of having confined their soda ash activities to their traditional
home markets, with Solvay supplying continental Western Europe and ICI serving the United Kingdom,
during at least 17 years (EC IP/90/1057 and OJ L 152, 1991).
3A recent focus is on the precise content of communication that supports collusion. For example,
Harrington et al. (2016) compare the collusive effects of price announcements with those of unrestricted
communication. Fonseca et al. (2018) and Fischer and Normann (2019) use text mining to understand
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According to European case law, communication between firms is more likely to be
considered harmful if (i) the information exchanged is firm-specific rather than aggre-
gated, (ii) is concealed from customers and potential entrants, and (iii) concerns either
recent conduct or future plans in relation to pricing and supply (Kühn, 2001). Informa-
tion on recent behavior and decisions is considered as “hard” because it is in principle
available and verifiable for the parties. In contrast, communication about planned future
market conduct conveys information that is “soft” in the sense that it is unbinding and
about intentions, which are not verifiable at the time the firms take their decisions (Kühn,
2001, p.170).
Communication of soft information is known as cheap talk in economic theory. Cheap
talk can enhance collusion when it helps firms resolve the strategic uncertainty that
typically occurs in games with multiple equilibria (Farrell, 1987).4 While the impact of
cheap talk in pure coordination games (like the battle of the sexes) is well established in
the literature, its effect in oligopoly games is subject to debate among economic theorists
(Farrell and Rabin, 1996; Whinston, 2008).
Regarding the exchange of hard information, Stigler (1964) argued that it can fa-
cilitate collusion very effectively. The heart of Stigler’s argument is that to detect and
punish deviations from a collusive agreement, firms must be able to monitor their co-
conspirators’ actions. This ability to monitor makes punishment a credible threat that
disciplines the cartel members.5 Stigler’s work has inspired antitrust policy on informa-
tion exchange between firms. Accordingly, the EC distinguishes between the exchange
of aggregate industry and individual firm data:6 while it does not object the exchange
of information on sales and production as long as the data does not allow to identify
individual firms, the EC has taken the stance in various antitrust decisions that the pub-
lication of individualized data would make markets artificially transparent and, thereby,
less competitive.7
In the present paper, we examine the effect of both types of information—hard and
soft—on collusion in an environment with multiple markets. A priori, it is unclear
what kind of language is most useful to supporting collusion.
4See, e.g., Cason (1995) for a discussion of cheap talk in collusion in relation to the antitrust investi-
gation around the tariff publishing system in the U.S. airline industry where airlines were alleged to use
non-binding price signals to raise fares.
5Green and Porter (1984) show that imperfect observability of rivals’ past actions makes collusion
more difficult in the sense that temporary price wars are needed to sustain collusion. Abreu et al. (1986)
extend Green and Porter (1984)’s model to include optimal punishment strategies. Kandori (1992) shows
that the set of equilibria increases towards more collusive outcomes when observability improves. Aoyagi
and Fréchette (2009), and Aoyagi et al. (2019) provide corresponding experimental evidence.
6See Kühn and Vives (1995) for a detailed analysis of the EC’s competition policy regarding infor-
mation exchange.
7See, e.g., the decisions on UK Agricultural Tractors Exchange (OJ L 20, 1993), Fatty Acids (OJ L
3, 1987). Market transparency is also an important element in the assessment of coordinated effects in
merger reviews: the likelihood of tacit collusion in the aftermath of a merger is seen as directly related
to the firms’ ability to monitor the other firms in the market (EU Guidelines on the Assessment of
Horizontal Mergers, 2004, paragraphs 49–51).
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whether, and if so, to what extent communication helps collusion in such an environ-
ment. On the one hand, the presence of multiple markets exacerbates the problem of
equilibrium selection in games with repeated interactions: firms can collude by either
sharing markets along the “home market principle” (Harrington, 2006, p. 24) or jointly
restricting supply (establishing quotas) within each of the markets. Soft information may
be essential for reducing strategic uncertainty in this context. On the other hand, the
existence of home markets offers firms a straightforward way of coordination in the form
of market sharing. If market sharing serves as a strong focal point firms may be able to
collude without communication (Motta, 2009).
The effect of hard information is also difficult to assess without further study. Intu-
itively, the exchange of hard information on individualized firm data may be effective in
the sense of Stigler (1964). It enables firms to identify and selectively punish a deviating
firm in its home market. Targeted punishment has been shown to effectively stabilize
collusion in single-market oligopolies (Roux and Thöni, 2015). In a multimarket context,
punishment by hitting the cheater in its home market may be particularly attractive as
it preserves the collusive relationship with the abiding firms and therefore prevents a
general price war and the ensuing breakdown of the entire collusive network (Proctor,
2014).8 In the absence of information that identifies the deviator, selective punishment
is not feasible.9 But exactly because punishment can be targeted specifically at the ag-
gressor, collusion may become less stable. Targeted punishment decreases not only the
cost of retaliation but also the cost of a deviation (Byford and Gans, 2014).
We report evidence on a series of Cournot oligopoly experiments with multiple markets
and repeated interaction. We have a two-by-two factorial design, varying the availability
of hard and soft information. In the treatments with hard information, after each period,
the players get disaggregated feedback on their rivals’ individual supply in that period.
Without hard information, in contrast, this feedback is sufficiently aggregated such that
the identification of individual behavior is impossible. In the treatments with soft infor-
mation, the players can engage in one-time free-form communication via a chat in the
middle of the game.
Our main motivation to use a laboratory experiment is that it is difficult to get
insights into our research question with field data: first, an experimental investigation
avoids the sample-selection problems that empirical cartel studies usually face (Posner,
1970). Second, even if we were to observe all existing cartels, we could hardly ever learn
about which type of information contributed to what degree to their stability. Finally,
8In the theory of single-market collusion in repeated games, deviations from a collusive agreement
are punished with a reversion to static Nash conditions which hits not only defectors, but all members
of the collusive agreement (Friedman, 1971; Green and Porter, 1984; Abreu, 1988).
9In Verboven (1998)’s oligopoly model with localized competition, the firms’ inability to impose
selective punishments is at the heart of their ‘communication problem’ which makes the use of information
exchange mechanisms for collusive purposes worthwhile.
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running an experiment allows us to effectively control the availability and timing of the
information as well as to observe the communication content and its effects.
We can summarize our main results as follows. First, we find that soft information es-
tablishes collusion almost perfectly. The chat protocols reveal that the subjects primarily
talk about agreements and promises on future conduct which, in theory, are regarded as
cheap talk and thus, in principle, without any effect on market outcomes. In our exper-
iment, it turns out that it is exactly this information that carries a strong potential for
collusion, especially if it helps firms to agree on a future course of action. This finding
is in line with the argument that the exchange of soft information can help to resolve
strategic uncertainty. Second, we find that the exchange of hard information tends to
help collusion in our experiment. Compared to the impact of soft information, however,
this effect seems to be rather small. Third, we find that the key driver behind the strong
effect of soft information on collusive success is the explicit consent to a future course of
action stated by all group members during the chat.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 overviews related
literature. Section 3 describes the experimental design. Section 4 explains our hypotheses.
Section 5 discusses our results. Section 6 briefly concludes.
2 Related Literature
Our paper is closely related to the literature on market transparency that studies whether
more information about opponents’ recent actions yields less competitive market out-
comes. Overall, this literature is inconclusive. While there is some empirical support for
Stigler’s argument, oligopoly experiments provide mixed results.10 Huck et al. (2000) are
first to test the impact of the level of information aggregation on the competitiveness of
oligopoly markets in a laboratory experiment. They run two treatments: in one, subjects
are given information on their opponents’ individual actions—prices or quantities—and
profits. In the other, subjects receive only aggregate information—average quantities
or prices. The authors find that the availability of individualized information makes
markets more competitive. They explain this finding with the argument advanced by
Vega-Redondo (1997): the publication of individual data increases the competitiveness
of markets if it allows firms to imitate their most successful rivals which tend to be those
that produce the largest quantity. The findings of Huck et al. (1999), Offerman et al.
(2002), and Altavilla et al. (2006) are in line with this argument. Gomez-Martinez et al.
(2016) find further support for the imitation hypothesis depending on whether the market
environment is competitive or not. Huck et al. (2000) as well as Gomez-Martinez et al.
10See Albæk et al. (1997) for direct evidence, Levenstein and Suslow (2006) for indirect evidence
on joint sales agencies and trade associations, and Potters (2009) for a comprehensive review of the
experimental literature on the effect of transparency on the competitiveness of markets.
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(2016) consider a single-market environment where the demand realization is perfectly
observed. In such a framework without any uncertainty, firms can make inferences about
their rivals’ recent actions based on their past realized profits even if information is aggre-
gated. An unexpectedly low price or high output by a deviating firm would be inferred
by all other firms in the market because they would all suffer from a profit reduction.
Additional information on each rival’s individual actions make a difference insofar as it
enables firms to impose selective punishments on the deviators. In a single-market frame-
work, however, such selective punishment is not feasible, unless firms find ways to target
punishment towards other firms by means other than prices or quantities (Roux and
Thöni, 2015). In our setting with multiple markets, this is different: only individualized
information makes the identification and selective punishment of deviators possible.11
Our analysis echoes the findings of the experimental literature on communication
in oligopoly games. These studies show that communication helps collusion, including
Daughety and Forsythe (1987); Waichman et al. (2014); Normann et al. (2005); Gomez-
Martinez et al. (2016) for Cournot and Andersson and Wengström (2007); Fonseca and
Normann (2012, 2014); Cooper and Kühn (2014); Harrington et al. (2016) for Bertrand
games. The main difference between our work and this experimental literature is twofold:
first, we consider multiple markets. We build on the design by Roux et al. (2016) who use
a two-firm two-market setup to study home bias in international trade. The multimarket
setting allows us to study how firms coordinate behavior across markets (rather than
within a single market) and to investigate when and to what degree communication helps
them to achieve this coordination. In addition to colluding on the intensive margin, a
multimarket environment offers the possibility to enter or exit markets, which opens up
a broader range of collusive strategies.12
Second, while our subjects interact repeatedly, they communicate only once, halfway
through the game. We can thus investigate whether soft information has a lasting effect.
To our knowledge, there are virtually no oligopoly experiments with one-time communi-
cation.13 Usually, the communication possibility recurs every period (as e.g., in Fonseca
and Normann, 2012) or at regular intervals (e.g., every five periods in Gomez-Martinez
et al., 2016).
Finally, our paper is related to the literature on market sharing. Although the glob-
11In a recent empirical study, Bhaskarabhatla et al. (2016) document on the importance of targeted
punishment in the cartel of retail pharmaceutical traders in India.
12A related strand of research investigates entry and exit in an experiment where firms have the choice
between a number of markets (Gächter et al., 2006), or where firms can contest an existing monopoly
market by entering (Edlin et al., 2019).
13Notable exceptions are Cooper and Kühn (2014) and Fischer and Normann (2019). They con-
sider one-time communication prior to the start of each of several supergames (respectively proxies for
supergames) with stranger rematching between the games. The long-run effect of communication on
price setting behavior has been studied by Fonseca and Normann (2012) using a within-subject design.
The authors find that even after communication is disabled the cooperation rate remains high. Before
communication stops, subjects can talk every period though.
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alization of markets and the deregulation of industries which used to be regulated on a
territorial basis have continuously increased the scope of market sharing over recent years,
only few studies examine this collusive practice. These studies theoretically analyze the
conditions under which market sharing agreements are stable (e.g., spheres of influence in
Bernheim and Whinston (1990), stable and efficient networks in Belleflamme and Bloch
(2004)) and, in particular, more stable than quota agreements (e.g., market sharing rather
than production quotas in Belleflamme and Bloch (2008), and mutual avoidance rather
than multimarket contact in Byford and Gans (2014)). Our experimental set-up can be
seen as capturing a special case of Byford and Gans (2014) with symmetric firms, no trade
cost, and no separate entry stage. We rely partly on this study to derive our hypotheses
in Section 4. Apart from carefully documented case evidence (e.g., Harrington, 2006), we
are not aware of any systematic empirical or experimental study on the topic.
3 Experimental Design and Procedures
We analyze Cournot oligopoly markets with constant marginal costs of production and
no fixed costs. There are three symmetric firms that can produce in three equal-sized
markets. In the stage game, the firms simultaneously and independently choose quantities
for the production of a homogeneous good. Their action sets are numbers between 0 and
74 with 0.1 as the smallest increment. In each market, the price is determined by the
same linear market demand p = max{74−∑3i=1 qi, 0}. The marginal cost of production
is equal to 2, and there are no fees attached to market entry.
In the static Nash equilibrium of this game, each firm offers qNi = 18 in each market,
such that the total quantity per firm is equal to QN = 54. The joint-profit maximizing
solution requires monopoly quantities QC = 36 in all markets. The allocation of the three
firms’ quantities to markets is indetermined, but our results strongly suggest two focal
solutions: (i) market sharing, in which each firm serves only one market with QC , and
(ii) production quota, in which each firm offers a third of QC in each market.
Our main treatments feature the same number of markets and firms. In two additional
experiments we expand the findings. First, we investigate whether our results are driven
by the symmetry of firms and markets and study a setting with three firms and four
markets (with identical parameters as in the main treatments). Second, we test whether
the multimarket context of our design is particularly favorable to collusive outcomes. To
do this we ran treatments where three firms face a single market. The single market is
payoff equivalent to the three markets of our main treatments: firms face a demand of
p = max{74− 13
∑3
i=1 qi, 0}, and in the symmetric Nash equilibrium each firm offers qi =
QN and earns the same profit as in the treatments with three markets. The symmetric
collusive outcome is achieved when all firms offer QC , and payoffs are again identical
to the collusive outcome with three markets. In contrast to the situation with multiple
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Table 1: Experimental treatments and observations
Soft information
not available available
Hard information
not available NoInfo SoftInfo
(90; 30;−) (57; 27; 30)
available HardInfo FullInfo
(96; 30;−) (57; 30; 30)
Notes: Numbers in parentheses show the observations in the treatments with (3
markets; 4 markets; 1 market). In all experiments, group size is three such that the
numbers divided by three corresponds to the number of independent observations.
Sessions were typically run with 24 to 30 subjects, except for the experiments with
three markets, where two sessions in NoInfo and one in HardInfo were run with 12
to 15 subjects.
markets, the single-market design has the property that the fully collusive solution is
unique.14 For all treatments and markets it holds that the collusive price is pC = 38 and
the static Nash-equilibrium price is pN = 20.
We apply a between-subjects design, i.e., each subject participates only in one treat-
ment. A treatment consists of 20 periods of the stage game.15 At the end of each period,
subjects are informed about their rivals’ output and their own profits in all markets. In
the beginning of the experiment, subjects are randomly allocated to groups of three, and
the group composition remains constant across the 20 periods (partner matching). In
all treatments, each firm is identified by a different color (yellow, red, and blue). In the
main treatments, each market is also assigned one of these three colors. The colors are
exogenously determined and stay the same during the 20 periods and are observed by the
three players. In the treatments with four markets, we add an additional market with
the color purple. In the treatment with one market, there is only a single market with
the color purple.
Our main treatment variables are the availability of hard and soft information. Table 1
summarizes the design and the number of observations. Hard information refers to the
observability of individual market shares. The treatments differ with respect to the
information firms receive at the end of each period. Figure 1 shows a part of the feedback
screen in which a firm is informed about the quantities in one of the three markets (for
14More precisely, while all strategy combinations with a total quantity of 3QC are joint-profit maxi-
mizing in the single-market game, there is only one solution which offers equal profits to all firms.
15Theoretical models of collusion require infinite repetition which would be simulated in the experiment
by having a random continuation rule (Dal Bó, 2005; Dal Bó and Fréchette, 2018). It is, however, often
observed in experiments that if the time horizon is long enough, subjects behave as if the time horizon
was infinite (Selten and Stoecker, 1986; Normann and Wallace, 2012). The recent literature on the
effectiveness of information/communication for collusion uses both finite repetition (Gomez-Martinez
et al., 2016; Huck et al., 2000) and infinite repetition (Fonseca and Normann, 2012; Harrington et al.,
2016).
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Figure 1: Screenshot quantity feedback.
Quantity
Your profit: 360
Market Red
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
Quantity
Your profit: 360
Market Red
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
Notes: Excerpt from the screen displayed at the end of each period informing the red firm about
the outcome in the red market. Left panel: hard information is not available (lower part is red,
upper part is gray); right panel: hard information is available (lower part is red, upper parts
are blue and yellow).
the full screen see the instructions in Appendix A.1). The bars indicate the total quantity
offered. The left panel shows the case where hard information is not available, as only the
firm’s own quantity is highlighted in the firm’s color, while the remaining part is gray.
When hard information is available the bar is divided into three parts, whereby each
color reflects the respective firm’s quantity (right panel). Consider a situation where
other firms invade a firm’s market. In the treatment without hard information, it is
impossible to tell which other firm is present in the market, whereas hard information
permits to identify the invader(s).
The second treatment variation is implemented as a free-form communication among
the three firms. In the treatments with soft information, subjects are allowed to com-
municate with the other firms in their group. Communication is a one-time event. In
between periods ten and eleven, a chat window opens for three minutes, and, during this
time, subjects are free to post as many messages as they like. The exception being that
subjects are not allowed to identify themselves or to post offensive messages. Subjects are
also aware that they talk to their group but that no one outside the group can see the mes-
sages they post. We chose free-form communication as it is the least invasive regarding
experimenter demand effects and proved very effective to establish collusion in previous
experiments (e.g. Fonseca and Normann, 2012; Cooper and Kühn, 2014; Gomez-Martinez
et al., 2016; Harrington et al., 2016). Subjects are informed in the written instructions
about the existence, the timing, and the exact circumstances of the chat possibility.
The numbers in parentheses in Table 1 indicate the number of subjects for a given
treatment and for the experiments with three, four and one markets. The main treatments
with three markets and the treatments with four markets were run in all four information
conditions. The treatments with one market we ran with soft information only, as the
main purpose was to investigate the degree of collusive behavior relative to the treatments
with multimarket contact in the conditions which actually permit collusion.
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Our previous experience with oligopoly experiments in a multimarket environment
(Roux et al., 2016) has shown that the complexity of the environment is quite demanding
on the subjects. For the study at hand, we therefore chose to start the experiment
with a phase of closed markets. During the first five periods each firm is restricted to
offer only in its home market, identified by having the same color as the firm.16 Aside
from allowing subjects to optimize their behavior in a non-strategic environment, this
design also resembles the early days of the European Union before liberalization and the
open common market. In periods six to ten, all markets are open to all firms. In these
periods, subjects have, depending on the treatment, access to hard information or not.
The treatments with and without soft information are identical in this phase (barring
possible anticipation effects caused by the upcoming chat). In between periods ten and
eleven, a screen appears which informs players about their own average profits achieved
over the periods one to five and six to ten respectively. After 45 seconds, this screen
disappears and play continues.17 In the treatments with soft information, subjects then
enter the chat stage before moving on to period eleven. The chat window is open for 180
seconds. In the chat, subjects are identified by their color. Our main focus in the analysis
will be on the second half of the experiment, i.e., periods 11 to 20. This is the phase
where we can observe the impact of both soft information—agreements in the chat—and
hard information—feedback about individual market shares. The length of the closed
market phases as well as all game parameters and the chat (if applicable) are common
knowledge before the experiment starts.
The sessions of the main experiments with three markets were run in the WiSo ex-
perimental research laboratory of the University of Hamburg between April and August
2017 and were programmed in z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007); recruitment by hroot (Bock
et al., 2014). The additional sessions with four and one market were run at the same
location between March and May 2019. Subjects were randomly allocated to computer
terminals in the laboratory so that they could not infer with whom they would interact.
Throughout the experiment, direct communication was not allowed. We provided writ-
ten instructions which informed the subjects of all the features of the markets (Appendix
A.1). We used an economic framing where we explained the strategic situation in terms
of firms, prices, and quantities (as in, e.g., Huck et al., 2004). Prior to the start of the
treatment, subjects had to answer control questions. When answering the control ques-
tions and when choosing their actions during the game, subjects had access to a payoff
16In the treatments with four markets, subjects know about the existence of a fourth market from the
start, but during the first five periods no firm can serve the fourth market. In the treatments with one
market, there are three monopoly markets in periods one to five (identical to the main treatment), after
which all firms switch to the single market with the flatter demand function.
17The first two sessions of each of the two treatments without soft information were run without this
information screen. We reran the experiment including the information screen to ensure equivalence
between the treatments with and without soft information. The data suggests that the information
screen did not affect the quantity choices of the firms. For the analysis, we will pool the data.
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calculator allowing them to calculate the payoff of hypothetical combinations of their
actions and the actions chosen by their competitors.
For the profits during the experiment, we used an experimental currency unit called
Talers. The payments to the subjects consisted of a 5 Euros show-up fee plus the sum
of the profits over the course of the experiment. Losses, if they occurred, were deducted
from the show-up fee. The sessions lasted for about 75 minutes, and the average earnings
were about 16 Euros (standard deviation: 3, range from 8 to 26). We conducted twelve
sessions with a total of 300 participants. The subjects were undergraduate students from
the University of Hamburg.
4 Hypotheses
We begin with the impact of soft information on the firms’ ability to collude. Based on the
experimental literature on communication in single-market oligopoly games, which shows
that free-form communication facilitates collusion (e.g., Fonseca and Normann, 2012;
Waichman et al., 2014; Fischer and Normann, 2019), we expect that soft information
leads to more collusive outcomes.
Hypothesis 1. Prices are higher when soft information is available.
Whether the effect of soft information should be stronger or weaker compared to
single-market oligopoly games seems less clear. Unlike previous studies, we consider an
environment that offers firms a straightforward way of coordination in the form of market
sharing. Market sharing may serve as a strong focal point (Motta, 2009), such that firms
may be able to collude even without communication. Soft information may then become
less effective compared to single-market environments.18 At the same time, the complexity
of the environment increases with the number of markets. Soft information may then be
particular helpful in reducing strategic uncertainty.
Next, we consider the impact of hard information on collusion. In the spirit of Stigler
(1964), hard information helps firms to monitor adherence to the agreement and may
thus facilitate collusion. At the same time, hard information enables firms to use selec-
tive punishments and, according to the theoretical model of Byford and Gans (2014), if
hard information has an effect at all, it destabilizes market sharing: in their baseline envi-
ronment with perfect information, firms can achieve the most robust collusive equilibrium
by using the strongest enforcement possible, that is, a permanent reversion to the static
Nash equilibrium in all markets in response to any deviation from market sharing (grim
18The theory of focal points dates back to Schelling (1960) and, with its discussion in Scherer (1967),
motivated a great number of empirical and experimental investigations in industrial economics (e.g.,
Isaac and Plott, 1981; Smith and Williams, 1981; Knittel and Stango, 2003; Lewis, 2015; Byrne and
De Roos, 2019).
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trigger). Hence, firms do not target their punishment, even if they could, and hard infor-
mation becomes irrelevant. In an environment with uncertainty, where firms happen to
violate collusive terms by mistake, temporary punishment is less costly than punishment
involving permanent reversion to competition. In this case, a firm may find it optimal to
target its punishment exclusively towards the firm that violated the agreement. Suppose
that the firms agree on market sharing, and firm 2 deviates and enters firm 1’s market.
Instead of reverting to the static Nash quantities in all markets, firm 1 can lower the
costs of punishment by entering only firm 2’s market and spare firm 3.19 However, while
targeting the punishment towards the firm that violated the agreement lowers the cost of
punishment, it also lowers the costs of deviation for firm 1 in the first place. It turns out
that, if anything, a cartel utilizing targeted enforcement is less stable than a cartel that
cannot use these strategies (Byford and Gans, 2014, Proposition 5, p.81). As the above
theoretical accounts do not allow us to come up with a unidirectional hypothesis on the
effect of hard information, we formulate an exploratory research question (ERQ):
ERQ 1. How does hard information affect market prices?
We now turn to our additional treatments where we let the three firms compete on
four markets. This setting offers no symmetric market sharing outcome and firms will—
even if they agree to stay away from their respective home markets—meet on the fourth
market. We conjecture that this interaction on the fourth market will make it less likely
that the firms reach and maintain collusion:
Hypothesis 2. Prices are lower in the treatments with four markets than in the treat-
ments with three markets.
For the treatments with a single market, we have no clear prediction for the overall
degree of collusion. On the one hand, the fact that the game lacks the obvious focal
solution (market sharing) may make coordination more difficult. On the other hand,
the simpler environment reduces strategic uncertainty for firms looking to coordinate,
because only one symmetric collusive scheme (quota) is available in the stage game. We
do not have an ex-ante reason as to which of the two effects dominates and thus formulate
a second exploratory research question:
ERQ 2. How does the multimarket environment affect prices relative to a single-market
environment?
Finally, the multitude of fully collusive equilibria in our multimarket setting begs
the question of what kind of collusive scheme the firms coordinate on. While market
sharing may serve as a focal point, a quota scheme reduces firms’ deviation incentives. In
19With our parameters, perfectly colluding firms earn a profit of 1296, and the static Nash profits are
972. Two firms in targeted punishment earn the duopoly profit in both markets, which sums up to 1152.
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particular, a quota agreement where each firm offers one third of the monopoly quantity in
each market increases the stability of collusion over that of a market sharing agreement.20
It is not clear which type of collusive scheme firms will primarily coordinate on (the more
obvious or the more stable), but we expect that, once collusion is achieved, lower deviation
incentives make quota more stable than market sharing:
Hypothesis 3. Conditional on having reached a collusive agreement, quota is more stable
than market sharing.
5 Results
We report our results as follows. In Section 5.1, we present the results of the main
treatments with three firms and three markets. In Sections 5.2 and 5.3, we compare these
findings to those from the treatments with three firms and four markets as well as three
firms and a single market. In Section 5.4, we take a closer look at the collusive strategies,
in Section 5.5, we analyze the contents of the chat messages in the treatments with soft
information, and in Section 5.6, we investigate the stability of collusive agreements.
5.1 Three Firms and Three Markets
For the experiments with three markets, we conducted twelve sessions with a total of
300 subjects. Average prices in the main phase of the experiment (periods 11–20) are
close to the static Nash equilibrium (pN = 20) when soft information is not available
(NoInfo: 21.8; HardInfo: 23.7). In both treatments with soft information, prices are
substantially higher (SoftInfo: 33.8; FullInfo: 34.1). The bilateral treatment differences
when comparing the absence or presence of soft information are highly significant (NoInfo
vs. SoftInfo: p = .000; HardInfo vs. FullInfo: p = .000).21 Bars in Figure 2 show the
treatment effects in terms of median prices. As a reference, we add a solid horizontal line
for the static Nash equilibrium price and a dashed line for the collusive price (pC = 38).
Median prices with soft information are exactly at the collusive level, while median prices
in the treatments NoInfo and HardInfo are close to the static Nash equilibrium level. We
can confirm our first hypothesis:
Result H1. Prices are highly collusive when soft information is available and close to
the static Nash equilibrium when it is not.
20Doing the calculations with our parameters, we find that the critical discount factor above which a
quota agreement is sustained by grim trigger strategies is lower (4/7) than the one for market sharing
(2/3). This result is a special case of the finding in Byford and Gans (2014) that in the case of Cournot
competition, ‘intensive margin collusion’ is more stable than ‘extensive margin collusion’ (page 80).
21We report two sided p-values throughout the text. All non-parametric statistics are two sample
Wilcoxon rank-sum tests based on independent group averages.
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Figure 2: Three markets, median prices in periods 11–20.
p
p
 N
 C38
20
26
32
38
FullInfoSoftInfoHardInfoNoInfo
M
ed
ia
n 
pr
ic
e
Notes: Median price in market 1–3 across treatment, periods 11–20
only. Horizontal lines indicate the static Nash equilibrium price of 20,
and the collusive price of 38.
The effect of hard information is less obvious. When soft information is available,
the results are basically indistinguishable (SoftInfo vs. FullInfo: p = .918). Without soft
information, the prices are somewhat higher for HardInfo than NoInfo, indicating that
hard information might support attempts to collude. However, the difference does not
reach significance (NoInfo vs. HardInfo: p = .210). We postpone our conclusions with
regard to the effect of hard information to include the data of the treatments with four
markets.
Figure 3 shows treatment averages of the total quantity per firm over the course of the
20 periods. Horizontal lines indicate the theoretical benchmarks which are the monopoly
quantity when firms operate in protected markets (period 1–5) and the static Nash equi-
librium for the remainder of the experiment where all markets are open to all firms (QN).
The dashed line indicates the symmetric collusive outcome (QC). In the closed market
phase, total quantities converge to the monopoly quantity. Once the markets open, quan-
tities quickly increase and converge towards the static Nash quantity, i.e., we replicate
what is well known from the literature, namely, that Cournot oligopoly markets with more
than two firms produce results close to the static Nash equilibrium (e.g., Huck et al.,
2004; Roux and Thöni, 2015). After period ten, subjects receive information about their
average profits in the two phases played so far and enter, dependent on the treatment,
the chat phase.
Figure 3 shows that the treatment effects documented in Figure 2 are stable over
time. In period eleven, both SoftInfo and FullInfo show average total quantities close to
the collusive level, and the quantities remain low until the last two periods. On the other
hand, the two treatments without soft information result in quantities close to the static
Nash equilibrium. The test for bilateral treatment comparisons in total quantities results
in very similar p-values than the tests for differences in pricing reported above.
14
Figure 3: Three markets, quantities over time.
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Notes: Average total quantity offered in all three markets, over the 20 periods
and by treatment. In period 1–5 markets are closed and firms can offer only
in the market of their color. In periods 6–20 markets are open; after period
10 subjects receive information about their average profits in the previous two
phases, and, in case of SoftInfo and FullInfo, communicate within the group.
Solid lines indicate static Nash equilibrium quantities, the dashed line indicate
collusive quantities.
To conclude, in accordance with the literature on single-market Cournot games, we
find outcomes close to the static Nash equilibrium when communication is not possible.
The presence of a strong focal point in terms of home markets seems not sufficient to
enable firms to collude in the absence of soft information. With soft information, a
majority of the firms reach a collusive agreement, and most agreements are stable over
time, barring end-game effects.
5.2 Three Firms and Four Markets
Do the treatment effects discussed so far hinge on the strong symmetry between firms and
markets? To check this, we turn to the experiments where three firms share four markets.
We conducted four sessions with a total of 117 subjects. Figure 4 shows the results of the
treatments with four markets. Relative to the theoretical benchmarks, we observe similar
results in total quantity when we introduce asymmetry between the number of firms and
the number of markets. Like before, the firms are monopolists in periods one to five,
after which all firms have access to four markets. We adjust the theoretical benchmarks
to the situation with four markets, i.e., the collusive total quantity is 48 and the static
Nash equilibrium is at 72. Again, we find that the opening of the markets produces a
strong increase in quantities with convergence towards the static Nash equilibrium.
Both treatments with soft information show quantities closer to the collusive outcome
in periods 11–20 than their counterparts without soft information. Both bilateral differ-
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Figure 4: Four markets, quantities over time.
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Notes: Average total quantity offered in all four markets, over the 20 periods
and by treatment. In period 1–5 markets are closed and firms can offer only
in the market of their color. In periods 6–20 markets are open; after period
10 subjects receive information about their average profits in the previous two
phases, and, in case of SoftInfo and FullInfo, communicate within the group.
Solid lines indicate static Nash equilibrium quantities, the dashed line indicate
collusive quantities.
ences are significant (NoInfo vs. SoftInfo: p = .000; HardInfo vs. FullInfo: p = .049).
With respect to the second treatment variation, we find again that hard information
seems to facilitate collusion when soft information is not available, this time reaching
significance (NoInfo vs. HardInfo: p = .029). Conversely, when soft information is avail-
able then this result seems reversed, albeit far from significant (SoftInfo vs. FullInfo:
p = .562).
Median prices are very similar to those shown in Figure 2, i.e., exactly 38 in both
treatments with soft information, exactly at the static Nash equilibrium level of 20 for
NoInfo, and 24 for HardInfo. None of the tests comparing average prices between the
treatments with three and four markets is close to significance (p > 0.7). To conclude,
we do not find evidence to support our second hypothesis that the existence of a fourth
market would hamper collusive success of the three firms:
Result H2. Across all information conditions, prices are very similar in the treatments
with three and four markets.
While we expected (but did not find) differences in the levels of collusion between
the treatments with three and four markets, our hypotheses regarding the effects of soft
and hard information are independent of this variation. We can therefore investigate the
treatment effects in the combined sample. Hypothesis 1 is clearly supported in the joint
sample, as all bilateral comparisons between the respective treatments are significant for
both three and four markets. Concerning the effect of hard information, we find weakly
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significant evidence for higher prices under hard information when soft information is not
available (NoInfo vs. HardInfo: p = .059). In the treatment with soft information, there
is no indication that hard information matters (SoftInfo vs. FullInfo: p = .722). We think
that the lack of effect with soft information is, however, not very informative. Because
soft information has such a strong impact on collusive success, the comparison between
SoftInfo and FullInfo is confounded by ceiling effects. For these reasons, we interpret
the weakly significant differences observed between NoInfo and HardInfo as suggestive
evidence for a positive effect of hard information on collusion. While this finding is not in
line with the theoretical predictions in Byford and Gans (2014), it supports the intuition
of Stigler (1964):
Result ERQ1. In the treatments with outcomes close to the static Nash equilibrium
(NoInfo and HardInfo), hard information tends to increase prices.
5.3 Three Firms and One Market
Increasing the number of markets over the number of firms does not seem to substantially
affect the success of collusion. In the treatments with soft information, we observe highly
collusive outcomes both with three and four markets. In a next step, we test whether the
multimarket environment in combination with soft information gives rise to particularly
collusive outcomes. For this, we compare the results of the treatments with three and
four markets to a treatment with a single market. Recall that parameters ensure that
the single-market treatment is payoff equivalent to the treatments with three markets.
An extensive literature on single-market oligopolies suggests that, in the absence of soft
information, results are close to the static Nash equilibrium (e.g., Huck et al., 2004). To
study whether our multimarket setup fosters collusion, we therefore restrict our attention
to the two treatments with soft information.
Like in the treatments with three and four markets, we do not find significant dif-
ferences in periods 11–20 between SoftInfo and FullInfo for one market (SoftInfo vs.
FullInfo: p = .353). For the analysis in this section, we therefore pool the observations
of the two treatments and focus on the effects of the different number of markets.
To make the quantities in the treatment with four markets directly comparable to
the quantities in the other two treatments, we rescale the total firm output such that
zero means the collusive quantity and one refers to the static Nash equilibrium quantity.
Figure 5 shows the relative quantities over time. The results of the treatments with
three and four markets are almost identical with respect to collusion in periods 11–
20. In contrast, the outcome of the treatment with a single market is substantially less
collusive. While the chat has a strong effect in period 11, the average quantities are
clearly more competitive throughout periods 11–20 and approach the Nash equilibrium
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Figure 5: Quantities in experiments with 1, 3, and 4 markets.
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Notes: Relative quantities over the 20 periods and for the experiments with one, three, and four
markets. Data from SoftInfo and FullInfo pooled for each number of markets. Relative quantities
is defined as Qri =
Qi−QC
QN−QC , with Qi being firm i’s total quantity on all available markets.
quantities towards the end of the game. This is also reflected in the prices, where both
treatment comparisons reach significance (1 market vs. 3 markets: p = .001; 1 market
vs. 4 markets: p = .010). To conclude, we have a clear-cut answer to our Exploratory
Research Question 2:
Result ERQ2. In the presence of soft information, the multimarket setting results in
prices that are substantially higher compared to prices in the single-market setting.
5.4 The Nature of Collusive Agreements
In the light of the highly collusive outcomes observed in our experiments with soft in-
formation, we now investigate the types of collusive agreements. We focus our analysis
on two types: (i) market sharing, and (ii) production quota. We define market sharing
as a one-to-one matching between firms and markets in which firms offer positive quan-
tities. As production quota qualifies any situation which gives rise to prices above the
static Nash equilibrium in all three markets (pm > 20 for m = 1, 2, 3), but is not market
sharing. For the treatments with four markets, we apply the same definition and ignore
the outcome on the fourth market for the moment.
Figure 6 shows the frequency of market sharing and quota agreements in the four
treatments. We pool the data from the experiments with three and four markets, as the
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Figure 6: Collusive agreements in the three home markets.
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Notes: Bars show the fraction of groups with a market sharing agreement (one-to-one matching between firms and
markets), or another collusive agreement resulting in prices above the static Nash equilibrium level in all three home
markets (Quota). We distinguish between the periods 6–10 (prior to the chat or information), period 11, and periods
12–20. The lighter bar shows the fraction of groups that agreed on market sharing or quota in the chat. We pool data
from treatments with three and four markets.
results are very similar.22 The left bars in each panel of Figure 6 show the frequency
of market sharing and quota agreements in periods 6–10, while the two right bars do so
for periods 11 and 12–20 respectively. For the two treatments with soft information, the
remaining intermediate bars show the outcome of the chats. We coded each group chat as
to whether the group members agreed on market sharing or some other form of collusion
(see Section 5.5 for more details). In periods 6–10, about 40 percent of the outcomes are
collusive in all four treatments. The collusive agreements predominantly take the form
of quotas, while market sharing is very rare.
For the two treatments NoInfo and HardInfo, not much changes in period 11. In
particular, there is no indication whatsoever that the information stage without the chat
would help firms to coordinate on market sharing. In the two treatments with soft
information, we observe that market sharing dominates quota in the chat, especially in
FullInfo. This carries over to actual behavior: there is a clear correspondence between the
fraction of groups that agree on market sharing in the chat and choose their quantities
accordingly in period 11, and beyond. Comparing the four panels of Figure 6 reveals
that the higher rate of collusion in SoftInfo and FullInfo is mainly due to the fact that
communicating in the chat enables many groups to coordinate on market sharing. In all
four panels of Figure 6, the fraction of market sharing situations is remarkably similar
in period 11 and the remaining periods 12–20, while this is less the case for quota. This
22We ran Fisher exact tests for differences in the frequencies of the three categories between three and
four markets, for each information condition separately as well as the whole sample. None of the tests
indicated significant differences.
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Table 2: Chat protocol
1 Firm A: if everyone supplies 12 everywhere, we will do best, right?
2 Firm B: 36 is the profit maximizing quantity
3 Firm B: yes
4 Firm B: or everyone in his own market 36
5 Firm B: right?
6 Firm A: yo, I think too, I do not care if everyone in his own [market] or 12 everywhere
7 Firm C: yo
8 Firm B: let us do 36 in the own [market]
9 Firm B: is easier
10 Firm B: ok?
11 Firm C: okay
12 Firm A: everything clear
13 Firm B: great!
Note: Example of a chat protocol from the experiment with three firms and three markets and treatment FullInfo.
is a first indication that—contrary to our Hypothesis 3—quota might be less stable over
time than market sharing.
If we combine market sharing and quota we observe that 30 (52) percent of the groups
in NoInfo (HardInfo) reach a collusive outcome in period 11. In the two treatments with
soft information, the corresponding percentages are 93 percent in SoftInfo and 97 percent
in FullInfo. We can compare these number to the results of the single-market treatments,
where we observe percentages of collusive play of 90 percent in SoftInfo and 80 percent
in FullInfo in period 11 (not shown in Figure 6).23
5.5 Chat Analysis
In this section we use information from the chat transcripts from SoftInfo and FullInfo to
complement the quantitative analysis (following Fischer and Normann, 2019; Kimbrough
et al., 2008). In a typical chat history, one of the subjects initially proposes a collusive
strategy and the other two agree to form a collusive agreement. The strategies that are
predominantly proposed are market sharing and quota, and most often the group follows
the initially proposed strategy without discussing alternatives. Only about a quarter of
the groups discuss both strategies, and the majority of these groups eventually agree on
market sharing.
Table 2 shows an example of a chat protocol (translated from German) that illustrates
how groups resolve strategic uncertainty. In line 1, Firm A suggests to agree on quota,
while, in line 4, Firm B suggests to share markets. Questions are used to elicit reactions
23The increase of collusive agreements when comparing the two treatments with soft information to
the two treatments without soft information is highly significant (p = .000, Fisher exact test). The
increase of collusive agreements from the single-market to the multimarket treatments does not reach
significance (p = .177).
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Table 3: Classification of chat messages and outcomes
1 market 3 markets 4 markets κ
Market sharing proposal: Home market – 0.76 0.89 0.74
Quota proposal: Home market – 0.46 0.39 0.78
Market sharing proposal: Single/4th market 0.17 – 0.13 0.67
Quota proposal: Single/4th market 0.82 – 0.97 0.66
Appeal to mutual benefits 0.95 0.93 0.95 0.64
Explicit quantitative statement 0.85 0.79 0.84 0.79
Threat 0.25 0.09 0.11 0.17
Disagreement 0.33 0.16 0.24 0.52
Question 0.95 0.91 0.89 0.90
Market sharing agreement: Home markets – 0.53 0.53 0.75
Quota agreement: Home markets – 0.18 0.16 0.95
Market sharing agreement: Single/4th market 0.10 – 0.05 0.87
Quota agreement: Single/4th market 0.50 – 0.63 0.67
Notes: The upper part reports the percentage of groups where the category was coded at least once (average of the two
coders), for one, three, and four markets separately. A message can be categorized into multiple categories. The lower
part reports the percentage of groups that reach the corresponding agreement. We define a group as having reached
an agreement if each member of the group states the interest in the specific collusive strategy at least once. We only
consider groups where the coding of both coders categorizes them as having reached an agreement. The rightmost column
shows Cohen’s κ to measure inter-coder agreement (Cohen, 1960), ranging from 0 (agreement expected by chance) to 1
(perfect agreement). κ larger than 0.8 can be considered “almost perfect”, above 0.6 “substantial”, and between 0.4 and
0.6 “moderate” agreement (Landis and Koch, 1977).
from the other firms (lines 5 and 10). In line 9, Firm B argues that market sharing
is easier to implement than quota, and the group members ultimately agree on market
sharing.
In a next step, we analyze the messages and the outcome of the chat systematically.
Following Fischer and Normann (2019), we recruited two research assistants who inde-
pendently coded all messages. The coders received a set of predefined categories and
were incentivized to code the messages accurately using the method proposed by Houser
and Xiao (2011). Each message was coded with respect to these categories, whereby a
message could be assigned to multiple categories. The coders were not informed about
our hypotheses.
Table 3 shows the main categories and the share of groups that exchanged at least one
message of the respective category (upper part) and the chat outcomes on the group level
(lower part). We report results separately for the different numbers of markets. As we
find no evidence that the chat content is sensitive to the availability of hard information
we pool the data along this dimension (p > 0.1, χ2-tests). The rightmost column reports
Cohen’s κ, a measure for inter-coder agreement, which varies from zero (rate of agreement
expected by chance) to one (perfect agreement). For most of the categories, we observe
an inter-coder agreement of 0.6 or above, which is considered a substantial agreement in
the literature. The low score for the category threats indicates that coders agree poorly
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Figure 7: Collusive effect of agreements.
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(Pre chat) and period 11 to 20 (Post chat). The left panel shows the groups that
did not reach an agreement during the chat, the middle (right) panel shows the
groups that agreed on quota (market sharing). Data of both treatments with soft
information and one, three, and four markets are pooled. Spikes indicate standard
errors, clustered on group.
on which messages represent a threat.24
The category market sharing proposal (quota proposal) captures messages that signal
the willingness to participate in a market sharing (quota) agreement in either the three
home markets or the single/fourth market. In order to qualify as market sharing, markets
must be shared either across markets (multimarket) or over time by taking turns (single
market), such that the quantity supplied by one firm does not affect the profit of any
other firm. The percentages confirm our observations from Figure 6 that market sharing
dominates quota in the home markets, while the opposite is true for the fourth or the
single market.
Chats also frequently contain messages appealing to mutual benefits. Here, subjects
underline the advantages of playing according to proposed strategies which might increase
the credibility of messages. Subjects also frequently state quantities and pose questions to
align strategies and ensure that group members agree with proposed strategies. Threats
or disagreements on the other hand are rare in our data. We consider these patterns in
line with the interpretation that the chat is mainly used to resolve strategic uncertainty
about collusive strategies.
Once all three subjects in a group have signaled their willingness to participate in
market sharing (quota), we consider the agreement to be formed. We require both coders
to mark the group as having reached an agreement. The lower part of Table 3 reports
frequencies of agreements in the home markets and in the single/fourth market. In the
former, market sharing is clearly the predominant collusive strategy. In the single/fourth
24The set of predefined categories draws from Cooper and Kühn (2014) and Dijkstra et al. (2017). See
Appendix A.2 for summary information and inter-coder agreement for the complete list of categories,
and Appendix A.3 for the instructions provided to the coders.
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market, where market sharing is only possible over time by taking turns, quota is the
dominant collusive scheme. Further evidence for the relative attractiveness of market
sharing comes from groups that discuss both strategies. There is not a single group that
agrees on quota after market sharing had been proposed as a first proposal. However, in
the groups where quota is proposed initially, 23% of the groups that eventually collude
agree on market sharing. We conclude that in a multimarket context, firms coordinate
rather on the more focal than on the—according to our theoretical argument—more stable
collusive scheme.
Explicit agreements in the chat are the key driver behind the strong impact of soft
information on prices documented above. Figure 7 shows the average price in the periods
before and after the chat. We pool the data from all treatments with soft information.
The left panel shows that for the groups which could not agree on a collusive strategy
(32 percent of the groups), prices only slightly increase. In contrast, for the groups that
coordinate on quota (middle panel, 26 percent) and even more so for those that agree
on market sharing (right panel, 42 percent) price increases are substantial and highly
significant (p = .019 and p = .000, respectively).
5.6 Cartel Stability
In Section 4, we pointed out that deviation incentives are larger in market sharing than
in quota, and predicted more stability over time for quota agreements. We explore the
relative stability of quota and market sharing using regression analyses. Table 4 shows
random effects models explaining profits in periods 11–20.25 To maintain comparability
between the four-market and the other treatments, we rescale the profits in the former
by three quarters. In Model (1), we run a baseline estimate with market and treatment
dummies. Given the effects on total quantities discussed above, the results are not sur-
prising. Compared to the baseline (NoInfo), profits increase slightly when adding hard
information. This effect is significant at five percent, providing additional support for our
Exploratory Research Question 1. In accordance to Hypothesis 1, we find that profits
increase substantially with the availability of soft information, while the difference be-
tween the coefficients for SoftInfo and FullInfo is not statistically significant (p = 0.43,
post-hoc Wald test). We also confirm our findings that the presence of a fourth market
does not importantly impede collusion, while profits in the single-market treatments are
substantially lower compared to the multimarket treatments.
In Model (2), we add a variable for time effects (Period) and include dummy variables
indicating whether the group reached a market sharing or a quota agreement in the chat.
In the treatments with four markets, these dummies refer to agreements regarding the
25As we estimate effects in a panel data, we use a random effects specification to address individual
heterogeneity (Fréchette, 2012).
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Table 4: Regression for profit in periods 11–20
Dependent variable: Profit
(1) (2) (3) (4)
HardInfo 125.89∗ 125.90∗ 125.90∗ 125.90∗
(50.20) (50.22) (50.23) (50.25)
SoftInfo 371.39∗∗ 293.68∗∗ 293.68∗∗ 277.11∗∗
(51.23) (66.41) (66.42) (59.02)
FullInfo 333.07∗∗ 256.89∗∗ 256.89∗∗ 270.83∗∗
(49.18) (55.17) (55.18) (58.58)
1 Market −190.85∗ −176.30∗ −176.30∗
(74.98) (74.20) (74.21)
4 Markets −20.78 −19.56 −19.56 −20.15
(35.27) (34.16) (34.17) (34.25)
Period −6.99∗∗
(2.33)
MS agrmt. 111.62∗ 183.94∗ 189.41∗∗
(49.55) (73.69) (73.22)
Q agrmt. 103.07 369.69∗∗ 257.74∗∗
(73.99) (89.44) (80.01)
MS agrmt. × Period −8.55∗∗ −7.47∗∗
(2.67) (2.73)
Q agrmt. × Period −21.09∗∗ −14.17∗∗
(4.19) (5.32)
No agrmt. × Period −3.88 −2.98
(3.21) (3.26)
Constant 837.60∗∗ 945.60∗∗ 897.51∗∗ 883.70∗∗
(39.18) (57.01) (68.16) (69.13)
χ2-test 79.5 109.9 164.5 161.9
p 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
R2 0.082 0.089 0.090 0.109
N 4770 4770 4770 4170
Notes: Random effects estimates. Dependent variable is a firms profit on the all markets
in a period. Profits of firms in our setting with 4 markets are rescaled by a factor 3/4.
Explanatory variables are treatment dummies (with NoInfo and 3 markets as the baseline);
dummies indicating groups that reached a collusive agreement (market sharing or quota),
or no agreement; period, and interactions. Robust standard errors, clustered on group, in
parentheses. + p < 0.1, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01.
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home markets only. We find a significantly positive effect of agreeing on market sharing
during the chat on average profits. For quota, we find a coefficient of similar magnitude
but it is not significant due to higher variance.
In Model (3), we estimate separate time trends for the groups that agree on quota
or market sharing and the groups that do not reach an agreement. Comparing the
coefficients on the interaction terms, we find that profits of firms with market sharing
agreements decay slower than those of firms with quota agreements (p = 0.012, post-
hoc Wald test). Contrary to Hypothesis 3, this suggests that market sharing is more
stable than quota. Note that these results might be driven by our treatments with one
market where quota agreements are the predominant choice. In Model (4), we restrict
the estimates to the treatments with multiple markets. The point estimate for the profit
decay in quota remains almost twice as large than for market sharing, but the difference
between the coefficients does no longer reach significance (p = 0.263, post-hoc Wald test).
Nevertheless, as the theoretical argument put forward in support of Hypothesis 3 does
not make any distinction between single and multimarket environments, we can use the
joint data set to evaluate the hypothesis. Taken together, the evidence speaks against
Hypothesis 3 and points towards superior stability of market sharing agreements.
Result H3. Conditional on having reached a collusive agreement, quota is not more
stable than market sharing.
Higher complexity of quota agreements may explain this result. For example, Hyyti-
nen et al. (2019) report evidence on Finnish cartels suggesting that quota cartels involve
more complex contracts than market sharing agreements. Moreover, the fact that quota
seems less stable and is most frequent in the single-market environment may explain our
finding on the differences between single and multimarket environments. As quota is pre-
dominant in the former, observed differences in stability can explain why it seems more
difficult to maintain a collusive agreement in a single-market environment. In fact, we
find that agreements established in the chat last on average four periods in the single-
market and seven periods in the multimarket setting, and the difference is statistically
significant (p = 0.040, Wilcoxon rank-sum test).
6 Conclusion
Antitrust law and practice suggest that communication between firms is crucial for estab-
lishing and stabilizing collusion. But what role does communication play for collusion in
multimarket environments? And what type of information has to be shared for commu-
nication to be particularly helpful? We investigate these questions in a series of Cournot
oligopoly experiments with multiple markets and firms. We have a two-by-two factorial
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design, varying the availability of two different types of information: (1) soft informa-
tion which is on planned future conduct, unbinding, and not verifiable and (2) hard
information which is on recent past behavior and (in principle) verifiable. In our main
experiments, there are three firms and three markets. In addition, we study environments
where the three firms have access to four markets or only a single market.
We find that market prices are highly collusive when soft information is available and
close to the static Nash equilibrium when soft information is unavailable. This suggests
that soft information is extremely helpful for collusion and that, as firms in our study
have only one opportunity to chat, it has long-lasting effects. Moreover, we find that
the presence of multiple markets reinforces the effect of soft information: compared to a
scenario where firms can collude in a single market only, our multimarket environment
shows substantially higher market prices. The key driver behind the strong effect of soft
information on collusive success is the explicit consent of all group members to a certain
collusive strategy during the chat. It turns out that the most successful collusive strategy
is market sharing (relative to collusion on production quotas in all markets). On the other
hand, despite being arguably a strong focal point, our results suggest that market sharing
is highly unlikely to arise in the absence of soft information. The agreements strongly
affect market prices: prices increase by 32% for those that coordinate on quota and by
36% for those that coordinate on market sharing. The exchange of hard information
increases market prices only slightly, and we observe such a price rise only when soft
information is not available.
It is difficult to assess to which extent the strong differences between the effectiveness
of hard and soft information are transferable to real markets. First, the two treatment
variations (soft and hard information) vary in more than one dimension. Given that the
two concepts are substantially different, it seems an impossible task to come up with
a design that implements a true ceteris paribus variation of soft and hard information.
There are, however, a number of interesting variations of our design, which might be
worthwhile to investigate in future research. For example, the disclosure of soft informa-
tion is voluntary in our experiment while the disclosure of hard information is automatic.
If the voluntary disclosure of information itself signals a firm’s willingness to collude and
if firms wish to reciprocate voluntary disclosure with collusive behavior, the effect of hard
information in our design may be understated. Furthermore, the fact that we let firms
only communicate once in the treatments with soft information might have an impact
on their collusive success. While it is intuitive to think that repeated chat opportunities
would help to maintain coordination on collusive play, it could also be that multiple com-
munication opportunities undermine cartel stability because of renegotiation. Finally,
from an experimental point of view it might be interesting to investigate to what extent
the strong collusive outcome in our multimarket experiments hinges on our framing of
the home markets. While we think it is natural and realistic to design the environment
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in a way which leaves no doubt about the allocation of firms to markets, coordinative
success in the laboratory will likely decrease when the environment does not offer clues
to allocate the markets.
To conclude, the multimarket environment we consider turns out to be very competi-
tive, and, in line with the evidence from previous oligopoly experiments, it seems difficult
to achieve a tacitly collusive outcome in the lab. A single opportunity to communicate
soft information, however, changes this conclusion drastically. For the observed upsurge
in collusion, reaching an agreement on the type of collusive strategy to be pursued (mar-
ket sharing or quota) is key. The single chat opportunity exactly serves this purpose.
Accordingly, our study points to the type of information that should be of particular
concern in antitrust enforcement. Increased market transparency due to the availability
of hard information (as collected and distributed by joint sales agencies) may not be very
effective for market sharing. What truly seems to matter is the sharing of future plans.
Consequently, it is soft information that antitrust authorities should pay special attention
to. Moreover, once firms establish a mutual understanding, additional exchange or meet-
ings are superfluous which can make a collusive market-sharing infringement difficult to
detect in practice.
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A Appendix
A.1 Instructions
[Instructions for the NoInfo treatment, translated from German. The parts that are different
in the instructions for the SoftInfo, HardInfo, and FullInfo are reported in boxes.]
Instructions
You are taking part in an economic study. You can, depending on your decisions, earn a fair
amount of money. It is therefore important that you read these instructions carefully.
These instructions are solely for your private use. You are not allowed to communicate with
the other participants during the entire study. If you have any questions, please contact the
supervisors.
During the study, we will not speak of Euros but of Taler. Your earnings will first be
calculated in Taler. The total amount of Taler you earn during the study will be converted to
Euros at the end of the study. The following conversion rate applies:
1000 Taler = 0.55 Euro
At the end of today’s session, you will receive your earnings from the study in cash. You
remain anonymous during and also after the study.
The study is divided into 20 separate rounds. The participants are divided into groups.
Each group consists of three participants. The composition of the groups remains the same for
all 20 rounds. Hence, you are in a group with the same two participants for all 20 rounds.
Each participant is the manager of a firm. There are three identical markets. In rounds 1
to 5 each firm can only serve one of the three markets. In rounds 6 to 20 all firms in a group
can serve all three markets. In each round, you decide which of the markets to serve and how
many units of the goods to supply. (In rounds 1 to 5 you only decide about the units of the
good.) The other firms in your group do exactly the same thing. The following rule applies:
the larger the total quantity supplied in a market, the lower is the market price of the good.
The unit cost amounts to 2 Taler, and thus, the per-unit profit equals the market price minus
2 Taler.
We will explain the exact procedure of the study in the next pages.
Information on the Exact Procedure of the Study
At the beginning of each round, each manager has to decide which of the markets to serve and
how many units of the good to supply. In each of the three markets, the firms face the same
market demand which is
P = 74−Q.
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P is the market price and Q is the total quantity supplied. For example, if your firm and the
other two firms in your group supply the good in the same market, Q is the sum of the quantity
supplied by your firm and the quantity supplied by the other two firms.
In each group, there is a firm Yellow, a firm Red and a firm Blue. The three colors are
randomly assigned to the participants. You are informed about the color of your firm on the
decision screen. One of the three colors is also randomly assigned to each of the markets. Thus,
there is a market Yellow, a market Red and a market Blue. The colors of the firms and the
markets stay the same throughout all 20 rounds. In rounds 1 to 5 each firm can only serve the
market with the same color. In the following rounds 6 to 20 all firms have access to all markets.
In the first round, you see the following decision screen:
The round number appears in the upper left corner of the screen. In the upper right corner,
you can see how many more seconds you have to enter your quantity.
You can use the “What-if-calculator” to determine your profits from different combinations
of your quantity and the average quantity of the other two firms in one single market. These
calculations are purely hypothetical and do not influence your payments. They only serve an
informational purpose.
If you want to supply in one particular market, you need to click on the supply-button first.
If you do, an input field appears. There is no supply-button in the market with the same color
as your firm, and the input field appears immediately. You set your quantity by entering a
number in the input field (maximum one decimal). If you click on the supply-button in round 1
to 5, you will get a message saying that supplying in this market is not possible yet. Once you
have entered your quantity, you must click on the OK-button. You can then no longer revise
your decision for that round.
After all firms have made their decision, your profit in each market will be determined for
this round.
Your profit in one market is determined as follows:
[74 − (your quantity + the quantity of the other firms)] · (your quantity)
− 2 · (your quantity).
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The profit of the other firms in the market is determined in the same way. The above
expression shows that, given your quantity in a market, the larger the quantities of the other
firms in this market, the smaller your profit. The same is true for the other firms. The larger
the quantity you choose, the smaller the profit of the other firms in this market. The expression
in the brackets is the market price. If the total quantity supplied in one market exceeds 74
units, the market price is zero. You can also incur losses.
In all subsequent rounds, the outcome of the previous round is displayed in the upper half
of the screen.
In rounds 2 – 20, you see the following decision screen:
Bars show the outcome of the previous round in each market.
The length of the bar shows the total quantity
supplied in the particular market. The parts in
different colors inform you about how much of
the total quantity your firm (in the color of your
firm) and how much the other firms (in gray)
supplied in this market. If your firm did not
serve the particular market, the color of your
firm does not appear in the bar. If none of the
other firms served the particular market, the
color gray does not appear in the bar. Your
profit earned in the particular round and mar-
ket is written in the line below the bars.
The picture shows an example for one of the markets. Your firm (yellow) has supplied 30 units.
The two other firms together have supplied 30 units (gray) and, thus, the total quantity supplied
in this market is 60.
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HardInfo and FullInfo
The length of a bar shows the total quantity
supplied in the particular market. The parts
in yellow, red and blue inform you about how
much of the total quantity each firm supplied
in this market. If a firm did not serve the
particular market, the color of that firm does
not appear in the bar. Your profit earned in
the particular round and market is written
in the line below the bars.
The picture shows an example for one of the markets. Your firm (yellow) has supplied
30 units, firm blue 10 units, and firm red 20 units. Thus, the total quantity supplied in
this market is 60.
In the lower half of the screen, you can enter your quantity for the current round, exactly
as you did in the previous rounds.
Between round 10 and 11 you will be informed about your average profits in rounds 1 to
5 and 6 to 10 respectively. For this purpose, an information screen opens during 45 seconds.
After 45 seconds this information screen closes and you can enter your quantity for the current
round, exactly as you did for the previous rounds.
SoftInfo and FullInfo
Between round 10 and 11 you will have a one-time opportunity to communicate with
the other firms in your group. For 3 minutes, a chat window allows you to talk to the
other firms in your group. No one, except the two other firms in your group can see
those messages. The number of messages is unlimited. However, your messages must not
reveal your identity (age, address, gender etc.) or offend other members of your group.
After 3 minutes, the chat window closes and you can enter your quantity for the current
round, exactly as you did in the previous rounds.
Do you have any questions?
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A.2 Classification of chat messages
Table A.2 reports the share of groups that exchanged at least one message of the respective
category, for each market setting and for the complete list of categories . The rightmost
column reports Cohen’s κ, a measure for inter-coder agreement. The categories were
predefined and draw from Cooper and Kühn (2014) and Dijkstra et al. (2017).
Table A1: Classification of chat messages
1 market 3 markets 4 markets κ
Market sharing proposal: Home market – 0.76 0.89 0.74
Quota proposal: Home market – 0.46 0.39 0.78
Market sharing proposal: Single/4th market 0.17 – 0.13 0.67
Quota proposal: Single/4th market 0.82 – 0.97 0.66
Other collusive strategy proposal 0.07 0.01 0.05 0.23
Appeal to mutual benefits 0.95 0.93 0.95 0.64
Explicit quantitative statement 0.85 0.79 0.84 0.79
Threat 0.25 0.09 0.11 0.17
Disagreement 0.33 0.16 0.24 0.52
Question 0.95 0.91 0.89 0.90
Encouragement 0.33 0.38 0.55 0.46
Greeting 0.70 0.61 0.74 0.96
Referring to another player directly 0.57 0.37 0.61 0.73
Fun 0.40 0.39 0.47 0.41
Request proposal 0.50 0.37 0.37 0.70
Previous events 0.63 0.38 0.42 0.79
Message cannot be grouped 0.23 0.12 0.03 0.48
Notes: This table reports the frequencies of each category for one, three, and four markets separately.
Frequency is the percentage of groups where the category was coded at least once (average of the two
coders). A message can be categorized into multiple categories. The rightmost column shows Cohen’s κ to
measure inter-coder agreement (Cohen, 1960), ranging from 0 (agreement expected by chance) to 1 (perfect
agreement). κ larger than 0.8 can be considered “almost perfect”, above 0.6 “substantial”, and between 0.4
and 0.6 “moderate” agreement (Landis and Koch, 1977).
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A.3 Full list of categories and instructions for coders
This appendix shows the instructions and explanations on the predefined categories pro-
vided to the coders.
Instructions on categorization of messages 
 
Your task: 
Your task is to evaluate into which categories each message falls. One message can fall into as many 
categories as you seem appropriate. There are 17 categories outlined below. 
 
Your payoff: 
You will earn your regular hourly wage for the time you spend on this task. At the end of the 
categorization, 50 messages will be chosen at random. For each message, where your evaluation 
matches the other evaluation perfectly, you will be paid 1 CHF in addition. 
 
The available categories: 
Category Explanation 
Signals willingness to participate in market 
sharing in markets red, yellow and blue 
The message signals that the sender is interested 
in a market sharing agreement in the three 
markets red, yellow and blue. 
Signals willingness to participate in quota 
agreement in markets red, yellow and blue 
The message signals that the sender is interested 
in a quota agreement, where each player 
provides a certain quantity in more than one of 
the three markets red, yellow and blue. 
Signals willingness to participate in market 
sharing in market violet, including the 
possibility to taking turns 
The message signals that the sender is interested 
in a market sharing agreement, including the 
possibility to taking turns, in market violet. 
Signals willingness to participate in quota 
agreement in market violet 
The message signals that the sender is interested 
in a quota agreement, where each player 
provides a certain quantity in market violet, every 
period. 
Signals willingness to participate in another 
type of collusive strategy 
The message signals that the sender is interested 
in a collusive strategy other than market sharing 
and quota agreement in any market. 
Appeal to mutual benefits 
The message refers to mutual benefits (losses) of 
(not) playing a collusive strategy. 
Request for proposal 
The message requests other members of the 
group to propose a common strategy. 
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Encouragement of strategy 
The messages has an encouraging element to it 
that goes beyond just agreeing to a proposed 
strategy. The message signals rather enthusiasm 
or particular happiness about the collusive 
strategy. 
 
(This category can only be a valid choice if the 
sender signals willingness to participate in some 
form of collusive agreement at the same time). 
Greeting 
The message contains a greeting toward the 
other members of the group. 
Funny message 
The message aims to amuse the other group 
members. 
Threat 
The message mentions negative consequences 
for other players, given a certain behavior.  
Disagreement 
The message signals disagreement to a proposed 
collusive strategy. 
Previous events 
The message refers to event that happened in 
previous rounds of the experiment. 
Direct contact The message mentions another player directly. 
Questions The message contains a question. 
Explicit quantitative statement 
The message contains explicit quantity 
suggestions on how much should be offered in a 
market. 
 
(This category can only be a valid choice if the 
sender signals willingness to participate in some 
form of collusive agreement at the same time). 
Other 
Please specify your thoughts in a brief comment, 
of why this message cannot be grouped.  
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